Manipulability of Voting Schemes

4 Pages Posted: 13 Apr 2008 Last revised: 22 Nov 2016

Date Written: March 1, 2008

Abstract

In the article it is proved that manipulability of a voting procedure depends on reliable information on the expected outcome of a voting rather than on violation of the Arrow’s conditions in disproof of Gibbard-Satterthwaite’s theorem.

Keywords: manipulability, voting, strategy-proofness, reliable information

JEL Classification: D71

Suggested Citation

Vasiljev, Sergei and Zhanaheva, Anna, Manipulability of Voting Schemes (March 1, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1118627 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1118627

Sergei Vasiljev (Contact Author)

Magna, Ltd. ( email )

Novosibirsk
Russia

Anna Zhanaheva

Independent ( email )

No Address Available

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