English Auctions and the Stolper - Samuelson Theorem

32 Pages Posted: 14 Apr 2008

See all articles by Juan Dubra

Juan Dubra

University of Montevideo - Department of Economics

Federico Echenique

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Alejandro Manelli

Arizona State University (ASU) - Economics Department

Date Written: November 2007

Abstract

We prove that the English auction (with bidders that need not be ex ante identical and may have interdependent valuations) has an efficient ex post equilibrium. We establish this result for environments where it has not been previously obtained. We also prove two versions of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, one for economies with n goods and n factors, and one for non-square economies. Similar assumptions and methods underlie these seemingly unrelated results.

Keywords: English auctions, Stolper-Samuelson theorem, single crossing.

JEL Classification: C60, D44, F11

Suggested Citation

Dubra, Juan and Echenique, Federico and Manelli, Alejandro, English Auctions and the Stolper - Samuelson Theorem (November 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1118843 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1118843

Juan Dubra (Contact Author)

University of Montevideo - Department of Economics ( email )

Prudencio de Pena 2440
Montevideo, CP 11600
Uruguay
5982 707 4461 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http:\\www2.um.edu.uy\dubraj

Federico Echenique

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

313 Baxter Hall
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States

Alejandro Manelli

Arizona State University (ASU) - Economics Department ( email )

PO Box 873806
Tempe, AZ 85287-3806
United States
(480) 965-3531 (Phone)
(480) 965-0748 (Fax)

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