Incentives to Reduce Crop Trait Durability

Posted: 11 Apr 2008

See all articles by Stefan Ambec

Stefan Ambec

National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA) - GAEL

Corinne Langinier

University of Alberta - Department of Economics

Stéphane Lemarié

University of Grenoble

Date Written: 2007-08-02

Abstract

To reduce the competition from farmers who self-produce seed, an inbred line seed producer can switch to nondurable hybrid seed. In a two-period framework, we first investigate the impact of crop durability on self-production, pricing and switching decisions. Second, we study how the introduction of a fee paid by self-producing farmers affects those decisions. We find that the monopolist may produce technologically dominated hybrid seed in order to extract more surplus from farmers. Further, the introduction of a self-production fee improves efficiency.

Suggested Citation

Ambec, Stefan and Langinier, Corinne and Lemarié, Stéphane, Incentives to Reduce Crop Trait Durability (2007-08-02). American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 90, No. 2, pp. 379-391, May 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1119001 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8276.2007.01110.x

Stefan Ambec (Contact Author)

National Institute for Agricultural Research (INRA) - GAEL ( email )

BP 47
38040 Grenoble
France

Corinne Langinier

University of Alberta - Department of Economics ( email )

8-14 Tory Building
Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H4
Canada

Stéphane Lemarié

University of Grenoble

Grenoble
France

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