Do UK Institutional Shareholders Monitor Their Investee Firms?

28 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2008 Last revised: 18 Mar 2014

See all articles by Marc Goergen

Marc Goergen

IE Business School, IE University; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Luc Renneboog

Tilburg University - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Chendi Zhang

University of Warwick - Finance Group

Date Written: April 2008

Abstract

As institutional investors are the largest shareholders in most listed UK firms, one expects them to monitor the firms they invest in. However, there is mounting empirical evidence which suggests that they do not perform any monitoring. This paper provides a new test on whether UK institutional investors engage in monitoring. The test consists of an event study on directors' trades. If institutional shareholders act as monitors, their monitoring activities convey new information about a firm's future value to other outside shareholders and reduce the informational asymmetry between the managers and the market. As a result, directors' trades convey less information to the market, and the stock price reaction is weaker. However, our results show that institutional shareholders do not have any significant impact on the stock price reaction which stands in marked contrast with the impact that families, individuals and other firms have on stock prices.

Keywords: Insider trading, institutional investor monitoring, shareholder activism, corporate

JEL Classification: G14, G39

Suggested Citation

Goergen, Marc and Renneboog, Luc and Zhang, Chendi, Do UK Institutional Shareholders Monitor Their Investee Firms? (April 2008). ; CentER Discussion Paper Series No. 2008-38; ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 208/2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1120204 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1120204

Marc Goergen (Contact Author)

IE Business School, IE University ( email )

Finance Department
Maria de Molina, 12
Madrid, 28006
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://www.ie.edu/business-school/faculty-and-research/faculty/marc-goergen/

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Luc Renneboog

Tilburg University - Department of Finance ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Warandelaan 2
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+13 31 466 8210 (Phone)
+13 31 466 2875 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Chendi Zhang

University of Warwick - Finance Group ( email )

Gibbet Hill Rd
Coventry, CV4 7AL
Great Britain

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