Optimal Auctions with General Distribution

16 Pages Posted: 15 Apr 2008

See all articles by Vasiliki Skreta

Vasiliki Skreta

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics; University College London

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: Oct, 2007

Abstract

This note characterizes revenue maximizing auctions in a single unit independent private value environment when buyers' distributions of valuations can be discrete, continuous, or any mixture of the two possibilities. The procedure described is applicable to many other single- or multi-agent mechanism design problems with transferable utility and single-dimensional types.

Keywords: mechanism design, optimal auctions, ironing, Dirac's delta functions.

JEL Classification: C72, D44, D82

Suggested Citation

Skreta, Vasiliki, Optimal Auctions with General Distribution (Oct, 2007). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1120865 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1120865

Vasiliki Skreta (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States

HOME PAGE: http://vskreta.wixsite.com/vskreta

University College London ( email )

Gower Street
London, WC1E 6BT
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://vskreta.wixsite.com/vskreta

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