36 Pages Posted: 17 Apr 2008
This chapter presents a public choice theory of criminal procedure. The core idea is that criminal procedure is best understood as a set of rules designed to thwart attempts to use the state's law enforcement power in a predatory fashion or in order to transfer wealth generally. For the most part we focus on a set of core procedural protections that can be considered long-established norms.
Keywords: public choice, rent seeking, criminal procedure theory, reasonable doubt standard, double jeopardy, ex post facto clause, due process, error costs, selective enforcement, cruel and unusual punishment
JEL Classification: K00, K14, K19, K39, K49
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Hylton, Keith N. and Khanna, Vikramaditya S., Political Economy of Criminal Procedure. Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 08-16. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1121441 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1121441