The 'Principles' Paradox

10 Pages Posted: 18 Apr 2008 Last revised: 17 Dec 2009

Abstract

This essay, prepared for a University of Cambridge conference on Principles Versus Rules in Financial Regulation, posits a new issue in that debate. Although principles-based regulation is thought to more closely achieve normative goals than rules, the extent to which that occurs can depend on the enforcement regime. A person who is subject to unpredictable liability is likely to hew to the most conservative interpretation of the principle, especially where that person would be a potential deep pocket in litigation. This creates a paradox: Unless protected by a regime enabling one in good faith to exercise judgment without fear of liability, such a person will effectively act as if subject to a rule and, even worse, an unintended rule.

Suggested Citation

Schwarcz, Steven L., The 'Principles' Paradox. Duke Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 205, European Business Organization Law Review, Vol. 10, p.175, 2009; Symposium Issue: University of Cambridge Conference on Principles v. Rules in Financial Regulation, Winter 2008, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1121454

Steven L. Schwarcz (Contact Author)

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-7060 (Phone)
919-613-7231 (Fax)

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