Anticipation, Asymmetric Information and the Announcement Effect of Greek Seasoned Equity Offerings

34 Pages Posted: 17 Apr 2008

See all articles by Susanne Espenlaub

Susanne Espenlaub

University of Manchester - Manchester Business School

Georgia Siougle

Athens University of Economics and Business - Department of Accounting and Finance

Norman C. Strong

University of Manchester - Alliance Manchester Business School

Date Written: 2008

Abstract

We investigate rights issues on the Athens Stock Exchange. Across 129 issues during 1992-99, we find a significant announcement effect of 2%. Further examination shows that firms were more likely to issue stock after large price run-ups, after recent earnings announcements, to lower uncertainty over their market value, and if they had not issued equity in the two years before the issue; smaller, more highly leveraged firms were also more likely to issue equity. We find no evidence that investors could anticipate issues. Both conditional and unconditional event study methodologies show that valuation uncertainty is the only variable explaining announcement period returns.

Keywords: Seasoned equity offerings, conditional event study, Athens Stock Exchange

JEL Classification: G12, G14, G15, G32, M41

Suggested Citation

Espenlaub, Susanne and Siougle, Georgia and Strong, Norman Charles, Anticipation, Asymmetric Information and the Announcement Effect of Greek Seasoned Equity Offerings (2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1121655 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1121655

Susanne Espenlaub

University of Manchester - Manchester Business School ( email )

Booth Street West
Manchester, M15 6PB
United Kingdom

Georgia Siougle (Contact Author)

Athens University of Economics and Business - Department of Accounting and Finance ( email )

76 Patission Street
GR-104 34 Athens
Greece

Norman Charles Strong

University of Manchester - Alliance Manchester Business School ( email )

Booth Street West
Manchester, M15 6PB
United Kingdom

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
263
Abstract Views
1,717
rank
116,018
PlumX Metrics