A European View on the Legitimacy of Accounting Procedures: Towards a Deliberative-Accountability Framework for Analysis

Posted: 31 Jul 2008 Last revised: 31 Aug 2009

See all articles by Ulf M.T. Luthardt

Ulf M.T. Luthardt

Tilburg University

Jochen Zimmermann

University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics; University of Bremen - Chair of Accounting and Control

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Date Written: July 1, 2008

Abstract

Accounting rules affect fundamental areas of social interaction encompassing interest groups that have diverse and conflicting interests regarding financial reporting. In the absence of a coherent social choice theory, concepts of legitimacy can be used to assess the acceptance of accounting standard-setting processes and their resulting norms. In this paper, we analyze the standard-setting process in Europe. Accounting rules in Europe are developed in a two-stage procedure in which private standard-setting is combined with public rule-making. From a structural perspective, the European Union (EU) is well positioned to develop legitimate accounting procedures. However, the original purpose and the ensuing legitimacy of its control mechanism are jeopardized when EU structures are (ab-)used for policy formation and the creation of EU-IFRS.

Keywords: accounting standard-setting, legitimacy, IASB, EU-endorsement

Suggested Citation

Luthardt, Ulf Michael Thomas and Zimmermann, Jochen, A European View on the Legitimacy of Accounting Procedures: Towards a Deliberative-Accountability Framework for Analysis (July 1, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1121858

Ulf Michael Thomas Luthardt (Contact Author)

Tilburg University ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Jochen Zimmermann

University of Bremen - Faculty of Business Studies and Economics ( email )

Hochschulring 4
Germany
+49 421 218 9121 (Phone)

University of Bremen - Chair of Accounting and Control ( email )

Universitaetsallee GW I
Bremen, D-28334
Germany
+49 421 218-9119 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.controlling.uni-bremen.de

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