Risks for Efficiency: Comprehensive Reform of Direct Regulation

Academy of Management Review, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 746-56, 1984

11 Pages Posted: 21 Apr 2008

See all articles by Fred Thompson

Fred Thompson

Willamette University - Atkinson Graduate School of Management

L. R. Jones

Naval Postgraduate School

Abstract

Alternative models of regulatory decision making/legislative choice are presented and evaluated. A limited rationality model oriented to the common good is proposed as more complete and no less accurate than any of the more cynical alternatives. The implication of this model is that many inefficient regulatory policies are mistakes and that under specified conditions these mistakes can be avoided or corrected.

Keywords: regulation, legislative process, bounded rationality, interest group theory of politics

JEL Classification: L43, D72, D78

Suggested Citation

Thompson, Fred and Jones, L. R., Risks for Efficiency: Comprehensive Reform of Direct Regulation. Academy of Management Review, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 746-56, 1984. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1122939

Fred Thompson (Contact Author)

Willamette University - Atkinson Graduate School of Management ( email )

900 State Street
Salem, OR 97301
United States
503-370-6228 (Phone)
503-370-3011 (Fax)

L. R. Jones

Naval Postgraduate School ( email )

1 University Circle
Monterey, CA 93943-5001
United States

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