The Incentive Effects of Appointment Tournaments in German Higher Education

14 Pages Posted: 29 Apr 2008

See all articles by Kristin Chlosta

Kristin Chlosta

University of Tuebingen - Department of Business Administration

Kerstin Pull

University of Tuebingen - School of Business and Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 21, 2008

Abstract

In 2001, the German system of higher education went through a set of reforms that - among others - were intended to create appropriate incentives for university professors. Empirically, however, even before the reform, publication records of university professors in German higher education showed consistently high output levels over a long period of academic careers. In this paper, we focus on the incentive effects of the appointment system in German higher education as one explanatory factor of the observed phenomenon. To that aim we extend a standard tournament model by (1) introducing J-curved effort costs and (2) accounting for systematic differences between two basic types of contestants, professors and junior scientists. In a last step of our paper, we use the extended model to analyze the effects of selected elements of the 2001 reform of German higher education on the tournament incentives arising from the appointment system.

Keywords: appointment system, asymmetric tournaments, incentives, intrinsic motivation, handicap, reform of German higher education

JEL Classification: A11, J31, J41, M51, M52

Suggested Citation

Chlosta, Kristin and Pull, Kerstin, The Incentive Effects of Appointment Tournaments in German Higher Education (April 21, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1123352 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1123352

Kristin Chlosta (Contact Author)

University of Tuebingen - Department of Business Administration ( email )

Mohlstrasse 36
Tuebingen, D-72074
Germany
004970712974916 (Phone)
00497071295077 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/Personal_und_Organisation/

Kerstin Pull

University of Tuebingen - School of Business and Economics ( email )

Nauklerstr. 47
Tuebingen, D-72074
Germany

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