Legislative Decision Making and the Size Principle

American Political Science Review, Vol. 73, No. 4, pp. 1100-8, 1979

9 Pages Posted: 21 Apr 2008

See all articles by Fred Thompson

Fred Thompson

Willamette University - Atkinson Graduate School of Management

Abstract

This article explains why previous empirical tests of the size principle have failed to produce conclusive results. Particular stress is given to formalizing certain aspects of the legislative process that cause minimum-winning coalitions to comprehend very large majorities; the implications of this process for legislative outcomes are explored by means of a simple Monte-Carlo simulation. It also proposes a new test of the size principle and reports some initial empirical findings based upon this test.

Keywords: Congress, legislative process, choice mechanisms, Monte-Carlo simulation

JEL Classification: D72, D70, D81, H72

Suggested Citation

Thompson, Fred, Legislative Decision Making and the Size Principle. American Political Science Review, Vol. 73, No. 4, pp. 1100-8, 1979. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1123641

Fred Thompson (Contact Author)

Willamette University - Atkinson Graduate School of Management ( email )

900 State Street
Salem, OR 97301
United States
503-370-6228 (Phone)
503-370-3011 (Fax)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
37
Abstract Views
559
PlumX Metrics