An Institutionalist Explanation of Joint Dominance

Massimiliano Vatiero

Università della Svizzera italiana


World Competition - Law and Economics Review, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 221-226, 2009

This article tries to formulate an institutionalist reassessment of the notion of joint dominance, a market situation in which certain firms indirectly synchronize the conduct in a ‘conscious parallelism’. In this article, the concept of joint dominance is treated as an economic common good with the resulting problems of coordination and free riding. We prove, then, that the essence of these problems explains the emergence of economic links between agents involved in a joint dominance. In particular, we define the limit of a joint dominance by the notion of conjectural variations.

Moreover, we distinguish different forms of joint dominance as deriving from the old-institutionalist J.R. Commons’ idea of transaction. We demonstrate that joint dominances composed by vertically related parties and/or by firms and the ‘public authority’ produce the reduction of a contestable Commonsian transaction as well as the horizontal joint dominance.

Keywords: market power, individual and joint dominance

JEL Classification: B15, D43, K21

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Date posted: April 30, 2008 ; Last revised: February 20, 2013

Suggested Citation

Vatiero, Massimiliano, An Institutionalist Explanation of Joint Dominance (2009). World Competition - Law and Economics Review, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 221-226, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1125922

Contact Information

Massimiliano Vatiero (Contact Author)
Università della Svizzera italiana ( email )
Via Giuseppe Buffi 13
Lugano, Ticino 6900
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