Political Selection and the Quality of Government: Evidence from South India

44 Pages Posted: 30 Apr 2008

See all articles by Timothy J. Besley

Timothy J. Besley

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Rohini Pande

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Vijayendra Rao

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2005

Abstract

This paper uses household data from India to examine the economic and social status of village politicians, and how individual and village characteristics affect politician behavior while in office. Education increases the chances of selection to public office and reduces the odds that a politician uses political power opportunistically. In contrast, land ownership and political connections enable selection but do not affect politician opportunism. At the village level, changes in the identity of the politically dominant group alters the group allocation of resources but not politician opportunism. Improved information flows in the village, however, reduce opportunism and improve resource allocation.

Suggested Citation

Besley, Timothy J. and Pande, Rohini and Rao, Vijayendra, Political Selection and the Quality of Government: Evidence from South India (August 2005). , Vol. , pp. -, 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1127013

Timothy J. Besley (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+44 20 7955 6702 (Phone)
+44 20 7955 6951 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Rohini Pande

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-384-5267 (Phone)
617-495-2575 (Fax)

Vijayendra Rao

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States
202-458-8034 (Phone)
202-522-1153 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://vijayendrarao.org

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
57
Abstract Views
714
rank
77,563
PlumX Metrics