Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India

Besley, Timothy J.; Pande, Rohini; Rao, Vijayendra

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Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India

LSE STICERD Research Paper No. DEDPS49

43 Pages Posted: 30 Apr 2008

See all articles by Timothy J. Besley

Timothy J. Besley

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Rohini Pande

Yale University - Economic Growth Center

Vijayendra Rao

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Date Written: October 2007

Abstract

This paper uses data on elected village councils in South India to examine the political economy of public resource allocation. We find that the pattern of policy-making reflects politicians' self-interest. Elected councillors benefit from improved personal access to public resources. In addition, the head councillor's group identity and residence influences public resource allocation. While electoral incentives do not eliminate politician opportunism, voters appear able to use their electoral clout to gain greater access to public resources.

JEL Classification: H76, H11, O12

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Besley, Timothy J. and Pande, Rohini and Rao, Vijayendra, Just Rewards? Local Politics and Public Resource Allocation in South India (October 2007). LSE STICERD Research Paper No. DEDPS49, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1127018