Download This Paper

Open PDF in Browser

Add Paper to My Library

An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking

Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 257-286, 1974

31 Pages Posted: 5 May 2008 Last revised: 19 Dec 2008

See all articles by Isaac Ehrlich

Isaac Ehrlich

State University of New York at Buffalo - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Chicago - University of Chicago Press; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Richard A. Posner

University of Chicago Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Abstract

No abstract available.

Keywords: Law Economics, Rules and Discretion, Judge-Made Rule

JEL Classification: K00

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Ehrlich, Isaac and Posner, Richard A., An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking. Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 257-286, 1974, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1127743

Isaac Ehrlich (Contact Author)

State University of New York at Buffalo - Department of Economics ( email )

415 Fronczak Hall
Buffalo, NY 14260
United States
716-645 2121 (Phone)
716-645 2127 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://arts-sciences.buffalo.edu/economics/faculty/faculty-directory/ehrlich.html

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

University of Chicago - University of Chicago Press ( email )

1427 E. 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Richard A. Posner

University of Chicago Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
LBQ 611
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-9608 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Download This Paper

Open PDF in Browser

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Place Job Opening

Paper statistics

Downloads

1,831

Abstract Views

7,814

Rank

18,403

PlumX Metrics

Recommended Papers

Timing Rules and Legal Institutions

By Jacob E. Gersen and Eric A. Posner

Federalism, Efficiency and Competition

By Larry E. Ribstein and Bruce H. Kobayashi

Optimal Timing of Legal Intervention: The Role of Timing Rules

By Barbara Luppi and Francesco Parisi

Harmonization of European Private Law: An Economic Analysis

By Francesco Parisi

Legislate Today or Wait Until Tomorrow? An Investment Approach to Lawmaking

By Francesco Parisi and Nita Ghei

Spontaneous (Non) Emergence of Property Rights

By Leonid Polischuk and Alexei V. Savvateev

Feedback