Getting to NO: Theory and Evidence for Instrumental Negotiations

33 Pages Posted: 7 May 2008

See all articles by Krishnan S. Anand

Krishnan S. Anand

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Pnina Feldman

Questrom School of Business, Boston University

Maurice E. Schweitzer

University of Pennsylvania - Operations & Information Management Department

Date Written: May 2008

Abstract

A substantial literature has examined negotiation problems. Throughout this literature, scholars have assumed that participants approach negotiations with the intent of reaching a deal and that negotiation participants cannot be significantly harmed by the negotiation process. In this paper, we challenge these assumptions. We define situations in which negotiators use the negotiation process to achieve goals other than reaching a potential agreement as instrumental negotiations. We explore the implications of this broader conceptualization of negotiations both theoretically and experimentally. We demonstrate that the mere possibility of encountering an instrumental negotiator significantly changes Nash equilibria and actual behavior; some negotiators are harmed by instrumental negotiators and other negotiators reject sincere overtures to negotiate. The possibility of instrumental negotiations significantly harms profits. We consider theoretical, prescriptive, and policy implications of these results.

Suggested Citation

Anand, Krishnan S. and Feldman, Pnina and Schweitzer, Maurice E., Getting to NO: Theory and Evidence for Instrumental Negotiations (May 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1127882 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1127882

Krishnan S. Anand

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Pnina Feldman (Contact Author)

Questrom School of Business, Boston University ( email )

Boston, MA
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.bu.edu/questrom/faculty-research/faculty-directory/pnina-feldman/

Maurice E. Schweitzer

University of Pennsylvania - Operations & Information Management Department ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-4776 (Phone)
215-898-3664 (Fax)

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