Is Stabilization of Potato Price and Supply Effective? Empirical Evidence from Idaho

35 Pages Posted: 6 May 2008

See all articles by Yuliya Bolotova

Yuliya Bolotova

University of Idaho

Kalamani Muthusamy

University of Idaho - Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology

Christopher S. McIntosh

University of Idaho

Paul P. Patterson

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: May 2008

Abstract

High potato price volatility, decreasing demand for fresh potatoes and prices below the cost of production led to a decision of a number of Idaho potato growers to organize the United Fresh Potato Growers of Idaho, a marketing cooperative. The programs and strategies of the cooperative target both production and marketing of fresh potatoes. To evaluate the effectiveness of the programs implemented by the cooperative, we examine the level and volatility of fresh potato prices during two periods: before the cooperative was organized and when the cooperative is in the market. We find empirical evidence suggesting that fresh potato prices were higher and less volatile during the period when the cooperative was in the market.

Keywords: agricultural markets, antitrust, collusion, GARCH, price variance, potato industry

JEL Classification: L1, L2, L4, Q1

Suggested Citation

Bolotova, Yuliya and Muthusamy, Kalamani and McIntosh, Christopher S. and Patterson, Paul P., Is Stabilization of Potato Price and Supply Effective? Empirical Evidence from Idaho (May 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1128746 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1128746

Yuliya Bolotova (Contact Author)

University of Idaho ( email )

875 Perimeter Drive
Moscow, ID 83844
United States

Kalamani Muthusamy

University of Idaho - Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology ( email )

Box 442334
Moscow, ID 83844-2334
United States

Christopher S. McIntosh

University of Idaho ( email )

Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Soc
Moscow, ID 83844-3172
United States

Paul P. Patterson

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
152
Abstract Views
1,594
rank
192,144
PlumX Metrics