The Choice in the Lawmaking Process: Legal Transplants vs. Indigenous Law

46 Pages Posted: 7 May 2008 Last revised: 9 Sep 2008

See all articles by Peter Grajzl

Peter Grajzl

Washington and Lee University - Department of Economics; CESifo

Valentina P. Dimitrova-Grajzl

Virginia Military Institute

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 3, 2008

Abstract

We develop a model of lawmaking to study efficiency implications of, and variation in, jurisdictions' choices between promulgation of indigenously developed laws and legal transplants. Our framework emphasizes the sequential nature of lawmaking, the ubiquity of uncertainty, considerations about ex-ante promulgation versus ex-post adjustment costs, and the importance of the political context of legal reform. In discerning the patterns of inefficiencies in both transplantation and indigenous lawmaking, we elucidate the role of heterogeneity of interests and adaptability of a legal system. We also find that domestic corruption per se need not justify transplantation of foreign legal models. Our results support the view that local conditions are a crucial determinant of the appropriate path of legal reform.

Keywords: Lawmaking process, uncertainty, legal transplants, indigenous law, interest groups

JEL Classification: D72, K0, K40, P51

Suggested Citation

Grajzl, Peter and Dimitrova-Grajzl, Valentina P., The Choice in the Lawmaking Process: Legal Transplants vs. Indigenous Law (September 3, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1130124 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1130124

Peter Grajzl (Contact Author)

Washington and Lee University - Department of Economics ( email )

Lexington, VA 24450
United States

HOME PAGE: http://home.wlu.edu/~grajzlp/

CESifo ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Valentina P. Dimitrova-Grajzl

Virginia Military Institute ( email )

Department of Economics and Business
Scott Shipp Hall
Lexington, VA 24450
United States

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