Who's Afraid of an EU Tax and Why? - Revenue System Preferences in the European Parliament

42 Pages Posted: 9 May 2008 Last revised: 14 Aug 2008

See all articles by Friedrich Heinemann

Friedrich Heinemann

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research; University of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics

Philipp Mohl

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Steffen Osterloh

Center for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Abstract

The EU's revenue system is still typical for an organisation based on international cooperation and stands in contrast to the Union's far advanced legislative and political role. This contrast feeds the debate on granting the EU an autonomous tax source. Our contribution explores the factors which shape the acceptance of the EU tax option among European policy makers. We make use of a unique database: A survey among Members of the European Parliament (MEP) which resulted in a response of some 150 of the representatives. Our results confirm an important role for party ideology and individual characteristics but they also demonstrate that country-specific factors are important to understand the support for an EU tax. In the light of our findings the status quo bias in the EU's revenue system can be attributed to the persistent importance of national interests with respect to fiscal burden sharing and tax policy.

Keywords: European Parliament, EU tax, revenue system

JEL Classification: D78, H29, H87

Suggested Citation

Heinemann, Friedrich and Mohl, Philipp and Osterloh, Steffen, Who's Afraid of an EU Tax and Why? - Revenue System Preferences in the European Parliament. ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 08-027, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1131204 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1131204

Friedrich Heinemann (Contact Author)

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.zew.de

University of Heidelberg - Alfred Weber Institute for Economics ( email )

Grabengasse 14
Heidelberg, D-69117
Germany

Philipp Mohl

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Steffen Osterloh

Center for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

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