The Russian-Ukrainian Political Divide

30 Pages Posted: 13 May 2008

See all articles by Amelie F. Constant

Amelie F. Constant

Princeton University; UNU-MERIT; CESifo

Martin Kahanec

IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Central European University; Central European Labour Studies Institute

Klaus F. Zimmermann

Global Labor Organization (GLO); UNU-MERIT; Maastricht University, Department of Economics; Free University Berlin; University of Bonn; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Journal of Population Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2007

Abstract

The Orange Revolution unveiled significant political and economic tensions between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine. Whether this divide was caused by purely ethnic differences or by ethnically segregated reform preferences is unknown. Analysis using unique micro data collected prior to the revolution finds that voting preferences for the forces of the forthcoming Orange Revolution were strongly driven by preferences for political and economic reforms, but were also independently significantly affected by ethnicity; namely language and nationality. Russian speakers, as opposed to Ukrainian speakers, were significantly less likely to vote for the Orange Revolution, and nationality had similar effects.

Keywords: Ethnicity, Orange Revolution, transformation, Ukraine, voting preferences

JEL Classification: D72, J15

Suggested Citation

Constant, Amelie F. and Kahanec, Martin and Zimmermann, Klaus F., The Russian-Ukrainian Political Divide (February 2007). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6085. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1131940

Amelie F. Constant (Contact Author)

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Martin Kahanec

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Klaus F. Zimmermann

Global Labor Organization (GLO) ( email )

Bonn
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UNU-MERIT ( email )

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