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Efficiency Gains and Structural Remedies in Merger Control

Helder Vasconcelos

Universidade do Porto - Faculdade de Economia (FEP)

February 2007

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6093

This paper studies the role of structural remedies in merger control in a Cournot setting where (endogenous) mergers are motivated by prospective efficiency gains and must be submitted to an Antitrust Authority (AA) which might require partial divestiture for approval. Both positive and negative effects of merger remedies are identified. First, structural remedies create new merger opportunities to firms. Second, when divestitures are required, the AA over-fixes, i.e., goes beyond the recreation of the level of competition that existed prior to the transaction. Finally, by insisting in over-fixing, the AA may discourage firms to look for more efficient mergers, inducing a final outcome where consumers' surplus is lower than if divestitures couldn't be required. Overall, however, structural remedies are shown to be good: consumers' surplus ex-ante is higher with than without remedies.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: Efficiency gains, endogenous mergers, failing firm defence, merger remedies

JEL Classification: D43, L13, L41, L51

Date posted: May 14, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Vasconcelos, Helder, Efficiency Gains and Structural Remedies in Merger Control (February 2007). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6093. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1132230

Contact Information

Helder Vasconcelos (Contact Author)
Universidade do Porto - Faculdade de Economia (FEP) ( email )
Rua Dr. Roberto Frias
4200-464 Porto, 4200-464
HOME PAGE: http://www.fep.up.pt/docentes/hvasconcelos
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