The Political Economy of Genocide Intervention: Structural Conditionality, Collective Command Responsibility, and the Former Yugoslavia

29 Pages Posted: 14 May 2008  

John Hagan

Northwestern University - Department of Sociology

Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich

Michigan State University

Date Written: May 12, 2008

Abstract

We examine the use of structural conditionality as a tool for genocide intervention. Structural conditionality is the practice of powerful global actors such as the World Bank providing assistance to countries contingent on economic, political and legal reforms. Structural conditionality has been used to encourage Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia to transfer politicians and soldiers to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [ICTY]. Our thesis is that this exercise of structural conditionality polarized, mediated and contextualized Serbian politics in ways that were initially successful but ultimately insufficient. We empirically explore the effects of structural conditionality on political attitudes in Serbia in 2005 using a representative survey conducted in Belgrade. Inferences are drawn about Serbia's recent election and further removed events in Darfur.

Keywords: international law, humanitarian law, ICTY, war crimes

JEL Classification: K33

Suggested Citation

Hagan, John and Kutnjak Ivkovich, Sanja, The Political Economy of Genocide Intervention: Structural Conditionality, Collective Command Responsibility, and the Former Yugoslavia (May 12, 2008). 3rd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Papers. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1132583 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1132583

John Hagan

Northwestern University - Department of Sociology ( email )

1810 Chicago Ave
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich (Contact Author)

Michigan State University ( email )

School of Criminal Justice
506 Baker Hall
East Lansing, MI 48824
United States
(517) 355-2194 (Phone)

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