The EU Emissions Trading Scheme: Disentangling the Effects of Industrial Production and CO2 Emissions on Carbon Prices

International Economics, Forthcoming.

37 Pages Posted: 15 May 2008 Last revised: 21 Feb 2014

See all articles by Emilie Alberola

Emilie Alberola

Université Paris X Nanterre

Julien Chevallier

University of Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint Denis

Benoît Chèze

Université Paris X Nanterre

Date Written: 2008

Abstract

This article critically examines the impact of industrial production for sectors covered by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) on emissions allowance spot prices during Phase I (2005-2007). Using sector production indices and CO2 emissions compliance positions defined by a ratio of allowance allocation relative to baseline emissions, we show that the effect of industrial activity on EU carbon price changes shall be analysed in conjunction with production peaks and compliance net short/long positions at the sector level. The results extend previous literature by showing that carbon price changes react not only to energy prices forecast errors and extreme temperatures events, but also to industrial production in three sectors covered by the EU ETS: combustion, paper and iron.

Keywords: EU ETS, Emissions Trading, Carbon Pricing, CO2 Emissions, Industrial Production

JEL Classification: L11, L16, Q48, Q54

Suggested Citation

Alberola, Emilie and Chevallier, Julien and Chèze, Benoît, The EU Emissions Trading Scheme: Disentangling the Effects of Industrial Production and CO2 Emissions on Carbon Prices (2008). International Economics, Forthcoming., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1133139 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1133139

Emilie Alberola

Université Paris X Nanterre ( email )

92, av. de la République, Nanterre
Room G301, Building G
Paris, Nanterre Cedex 92001
France

Julien Chevallier (Contact Author)

University of Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint Denis ( email )

Paris
France

Benoît Chèze

Université Paris X Nanterre ( email )

92, av. de la République, Nanterre
Room G301, Building G
Paris, Nanterre Cedex 92001
France

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
505
Abstract Views
2,030
rank
66,819
PlumX Metrics