The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis

Chiao, Benjamin; Lerner, Josh; Tirole, Jean

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The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6141

41 Pages Posted: 19 May 2008

See all articles by Benjamin Chiao

Benjamin Chiao

PSB Paris School of Business; Southwestern University of Finance and Economics

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Harvard University - Private Capital Research Institute

Jean Tirole

University of Toulouse 1 - Industrial Economic Institute (IDEI); University of Toulouse 1 - Groupe de Recherche en Economie Mathématique et Quantitative (GREMAQ); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

There are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2007

Abstract

This paper empirically explores standard-setting organizations' policy choices. Consistent with Lerner-Tirole (2006), we find (a) a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors and (b) a positive correlation between the sponsor-friendliness of the selected SSO and the quality of the standard. We also develop and test two extensions of the earlier model: the presence of provisions mandating royalty-free licensing is negatively associated with disclosure requirements, and the relationship between concessions and user friendliness is weaker when there is only a limited number of SSOs.

Keywords: Forum shopping, innovation, licensing, standardization

JEL Classification: L2, O3

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Chiao, Benjamin and Lerner, Josh and Tirole, Jean, The Rules of Standard Setting Organizations: An Empirical Analysis (February 2007). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6141, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1133786