Accuracy Versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence Under Different Procedures

35 Pages Posted: 19 May 2008

See all articles by Winand Emons

Winand Emons

University of Bern - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Claude Fluet

Université Laval

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2007

Abstract

An arbiter can decide a case on the basis of his priors or he can ask for further evidence from the two parties to the conflict. The parties may misrepresent evidence in their favour at a cost. The arbiter is concerned about accuracy and low procedural costs. When both parties testify, each of them distorts the evidence less than when they testify alone. When the fixed cost of testifying is low, the arbiter hears both, for intermediate values one, and for high values no party at all. The arbiter's ability to remain uninformed as well as sequential testifying makes it more likely that the arbiter requires evidence.

Keywords: Adversarial, costly state falsification, evidence production, inquisitorial, multi-sender game

JEL Classification: D82, K41, K42

Suggested Citation

Emons, Winand and Fluet, Claude-Denys, Accuracy Versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence Under Different Procedures (February 2007). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6150, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1133795

Winand Emons (Contact Author)

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Claude-Denys Fluet

Université Laval ( email )

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