Purchase - $5.00


23 Pages Posted: 19 May 2008  

Andrea Mattozzi

European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO)

Antonio Merlo

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; Rice University

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2007


In this paper, we study the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by a party who faces competition for political talent from the lobbying sector. We show that a political party may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that it could afford to recruit better individuals who would like to become politicians. We argue that this finding may contribute to explain the observation that in many countries the political class is mostly composed of mediocre people.

Keywords: Parties, political recruitment, politicians

JEL Classification: D72, J44, J45

Suggested Citation

Mattozzi, Andrea and Merlo, Antonio, Mediocracy (March 2007). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6163. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1133807

Andrea Mattozzi (Contact Author)

European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO) ( email )

Villa San Paolo
Via della Piazzuola 43
50133 Florence

Antonio M. Merlo

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

160 McNeil Building
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-7933 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~merloa

Rice University ( email )

6100 South Main Street
Houston, TX 77005-1892
United States

Paper statistics

Abstract Views