References (35)


Citations (10)




Andrea Mattozzi

European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO)

Antonio Merlo

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics; Rice University

March 2007

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6163

In this paper, we study the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by a party who faces competition for political talent from the lobbying sector. We show that a political party may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that it could afford to recruit better individuals who would like to become politicians. We argue that this finding may contribute to explain the observation that in many countries the political class is mostly composed of mediocre people.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: Parties, political recruitment, politicians

JEL Classification: D72, J44, J45

Date posted: May 19, 2008  

Suggested Citation

Mattozzi, Andrea and Merlo, Antonio, Mediocracy (March 2007). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6163. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1133807

Contact Information

Andrea Mattozzi (Contact Author)
European University Institute - Economics Department (ECO) ( email )
Villa San Paolo
Via della Piazzuola 43
50133 Florence
Antonio M. Merlo
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )
160 McNeil Building
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-7933 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~merloa
Rice University ( email )
6100 South Main Street
Houston, TX 77005-1892
United States
Feedback to SSRN

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