Are More Important Patents Approved More Slowly and Should They Be?

55 Pages Posted: 20 May 2008

See all articles by Pierre Regibeau

Pierre Regibeau

University of Essex - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Katharine Rockett

University of Essex - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: March 2007

Abstract

Innovative activities often are heavily regulated. Reviews conducted by administrative agencies take time and are not perfectly accurate. Of particular concern is whether, by design or not, such agencies discriminate against more important innovations by taking more time to perform their reviews. We study the relationship between the length of patent review and the importance of inventions in a theoretical model. We build a simple model of the US patent review process. The model predicts that, controlling for a patent's position in the new technology cycle, more important innovations would (and should) be approved more quickly. Also, the approval delay is likely to decrease as an industry moves from the early stages of an innovation cycle to later stages. These predictions are in line with the evidence we obtain from a data set of US patents granted in the field of genetically modified crops from 1983 to 1999. Our analysis also helps to reconcile the results on the relationship between importance and delay found in previous studies.

Keywords: Genetic modification, innovation, patent policy, regulation

JEL Classification: L43, O31, O32, O33, O34, O38

Suggested Citation

Regibeau, Pierre and Rockett, Katharine, Are More Important Patents Approved More Slowly and Should They Be? (March 2007). , Vol. , pp. -, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1133822

Pierre Regibeau (Contact Author)

University of Essex - Department of Economics ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom
+44 1206 872 731 (Phone)
+44 1206 873 598 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Katharine Rockett

University of Essex - Department of Economics ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom
+44 1206 873 333 (Phone)
+44 1206 873 724 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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