Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment

61 Pages Posted: 20 May 2008

See all articles by Dean S. Karlan

Dean S. Karlan

Yale University; Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management; Innovations for Poverty Action; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Jonathan Zinman

Dartmouth College; Innovations for Poverty Action; Jameel Poverty Action Lab; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2007

Abstract

Information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice. We estimate the presence and importance of adverse selection and moral hazard in a consumer credit market using a new field experiment methodology. We randomized 58,000 direct mail offers issued by a major South African lender along three dimensions: 1) an initial offer interest rate featured on a direct mail solicitation; 2) a contract interest rate that was revealed only after a borrower agreed to the initial offer rate; and 3) a dynamic repayment incentive that extended preferential pricing on future loans to borrowers who remained in good standing. These three randomizations, combined with complete knowledge of the Lender's information set, permit identification of specific types of private information problems. Our setup distinguishes adverse selection from moral hazard effects on repayment, and thereby generates unique evidence on the existence and magnitudes of specific credit market frictions. We find evidence of moral hazard and weaker evidence for adverse selection. A rough calibration suggests that perhaps 7% to 16% of default is due to asymmetric information problems. Asymmetric information may help explain the prevalence of credit constraints even in a market that specializes in financing high-risk borrowers at very high rates.

Keywords: Adverse selection, credit markets, development finance, field experiment, Information asymmetries, microfinance, moral hazard

JEL Classification: C9, D8, G2, G3, O1

Suggested Citation

Karlan, Dean S. and Karlan, Dean S. and Zinman, Jonathan, Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment (March 2007). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6182, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1133826

Dean S. Karlan (Contact Author)

Yale University ( email )

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Northwestern University - Kellogg School of Management ( email )

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Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

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Jonathan Zinman

Dartmouth College ( email )

Hanover, NH 03755
United States
603-646-0075 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.dartmouth.edu/jzinman/

Innovations for Poverty Action

1731 Connecticut Ave, 4th floor
New Haven, CT 20009
United States

Jameel Poverty Action Lab

E60-246
77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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