A Single-License Approach to Regulating Insurance
Northwestern Law & Econ Research Paper No. 08-10
26 Pages Posted: 21 May 2008
Date Written: May 18, 2008
State regulation of insurance companies has been criticized for many years because of the burden imposed on insurers by having to comply with the laws of many jurisdictions. These higher costs are passed on to consumers. The problems with the current regulatory structure are prompting calls for increased federal regulation of insurance. However, all proposals to federalize insurance regulation create opportunities for abuse at the hands of the federal government and fail to utilize the benefits of a federal system. This article shows how many of the problems of the current system can be addressed without resorting to a large scale intrusion of federal regulators into insurance markets. The proposed solution calls for minimal federal intervention to provide for jurisdictional competition between states that would be allowed to charter insurers that could operate nationally with only the single license granted by the charter. This single-license approach addresses the most salient concerns of proponents of federal optional chartering. It also has the potential for triggering competition and innovation in insurance products and rates while preserving a meaningful role for state regulation.
Keywords: insurance, financial services, optional federal charter, federalism, regulation
JEL Classification: G2, G38, K2, L5
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation