Wholesale Markets in Telecommunications

52 Pages Posted: 22 May 2008

See all articles by Marc Bourreau

Marc Bourreau

Telecom ParisTech

Johan Hombert

HEC Paris - Finance Department

Jérôme Pouyet

Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS); National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - Center for Research in Economics and Statistics (CREST); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Nicolas Schutz

University of Mannheim

Date Written: March 2007

Abstract

In telecommunications some operators have deployed their own networks whereas some others have not. The latter firms must purchase wholesale products from the former to be able to compete on the final market. We show that, even when network operators compete in prices and offer perfectly homogenous products on the wholesale market, that market may not be competitive. Based on our theoretical analysis, we derive some policy implications for the broadband and the mobile telephony markets.

Keywords: Telecommunications, upstream and downstream markets, vertical integration

JEL Classification: L13, L51

Suggested Citation

Bourreau, Marc and Hombert, Johan and Pouyet, Jerome and Schutz, Nicolas, Wholesale Markets in Telecommunications (March 2007). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6224, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1135464

Marc Bourreau (Contact Author)

Telecom ParisTech ( email )

46, rue Barrault
Paris Cedex 13, F-75634
France

Johan Hombert

HEC Paris - Finance Department ( email )

1 rue de la Liberation
Jouy-en-Josas Cedex, 78351
France

Jerome Pouyet

Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS) ( email )

28, rue des Saints-Peres
75007 Paris
France
+33 1 4458 2870 (Phone)
+33 1 4458 2880 (Fax)

National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) - Center for Research in Economics and Statistics (CREST)

15 Boulevard Gabriel Peri
Malakoff Cedex, 1 92245
France

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Nicolas Schutz

University of Mannheim ( email )

D-68131 Mannheim
Germany

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