Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening

27 Pages Posted: 22 May 2008

See all articles by Christian At

Christian At

Université de Franche-Comté - CRESE

Mike Burkart

Swedish House of Finance; London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Finance; Finance Theory Group (FTG); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Samuel Lee

Santa Clara University - Leavey School of Business; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Swedish House of Finance

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 2007

Abstract

This paper analyzes how non-voting shares affect the takeover outcome in a single-bidder model with asymmetric information and private benefit extraction. In equilibrium, the target firm's security-voting structure influences the bidder's participation constraint and in response the shareholders' conditional expectations about the post-takeover share value. Therefore, the structure can be chosen to discriminate among bidder types. Typically, the socially optimal structure deviates from one share - one vote to promote all and only value-increasing bids. As target shareholders ignore takeover costs, they prefer more takeovers and hence choose a smaller fraction of voting shares than is socially optimal. In either case, the optimal fraction of voting shares decreases with the quality of shareholder protection and increases with the incumbent manager's ability. Finally, shareholder returns are higher when a given takeover probability is implemented by (more) non-voting shares rather than by (larger) private benefits.

Keywords: Dual-class share structure, free-rider behaviour, tender offer

JEL Classification: G34

Suggested Citation

At, Christian and Burkart, Mike C. and Lee, Samuel, Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening (March 2007). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6241, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1135479

Christian At (Contact Author)

Université de Franche-Comté - CRESE ( email )

1 rue Claude Goudimel
25030 Besancon cedex, DOUBS 25000
France

Mike C. Burkart

Swedish House of Finance ( email )

Drottninggatan 98
111 60 Stockholm
Sweden

London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Finance ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Finance Theory Group (FTG) ( email )

United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.cepr.org/default_static.htm

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Samuel Lee

Santa Clara University - Leavey School of Business

500 El Camino Real
Santa Clara, CA California 95053
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Swedish House of Finance ( email )

Drottninggatan 98
111 60 Stockholm
Sweden