Women's Earning Power and the 'Double Burden' of Market and Household Work

33 Pages Posted: 21 May 2008

See all articles by Natalie Chen

Natalie Chen

University of Warwick - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Paola Conconi

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES)

Carlo Perroni

University of Warwick - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2007

Abstract

Bargaining theory suggests that married women who experience a relative improvement in their labour market position should experience a comparative gain within their marriage. However, if renegotiation possibilities are limited by institutional mechanisms that achieve long-term commitment, the opposite may be true, particularly if women are specialized in household activities and the labour market allows comparatively more flexibility in their labour supply responses. Evidence from the German Socio-Economic Panel indeed shows that, as long as renegotiation opportunities are limited, comparatively better wages for women exacerbate their 'double burden' of market and household work.

Keywords: Bargaining, Marriage, Renegotiation

JEL Classification: D1, J2, J3

Suggested Citation

Chen, Natalie and Conconi, Paola and Perroni, Carlo, Women's Earning Power and the 'Double Burden' of Market and Household Work (May 2007). , Vol. , pp. -, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1135507

Natalie Chen (Contact Author)

University of Warwick - Department of Economics ( email )

Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
+44 24 7652 8419 (Phone)
+44 24 7652 3032 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Paola Conconi

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium
32 2 650 2345 (Phone)
32 2 650 4475 (Fax)

Carlo Perroni

University of Warwick - Department of Economics ( email )

Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
44 24 7652 8416 (Phone)
44 24 7652 3032 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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