Tenure, Wage Profiles and Monitoring
24 Pages Posted: 23 May 2008
Abstract
We investigate the relationship between the slope of the wage-tenure profile and the level of monitoring across two cross sections of matched employer-employee British data. Our theoretical model predicts that increased monitoring leads to a decline in the slope of the wage-tenure profile. Our empirical analysis provides strong support for this prediction.
Keywords: monitoring, tenure, efficiency wages
JEL Classification: J33, J41, J54
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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