On the Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion

18 Pages Posted: 23 May 2008

See all articles by Tomaso Duso

Tomaso Duso

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin); TU Berlin- Faculty of Economics and Management - Empirical Industrial Organization

Enrico Pennings

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE); Tinbergen Institute; Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM)

Jo Seldeslachts

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB); German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin)

Date Written: April 2008

Abstract

Though there is a body of theoretical literature on research joint venture (RJV) participation facilitating collusion, empirical tests are rare. Even more so, there are few empirical tests on the general theme of collusion. This note tries to fill this gap by assuming a correspondence between the stability of research joint ventures and collusion. By using data from the U.S. National Cooperation Research Act, we show that large RJVs in concentrated industries are more stable and hence more suspect to collusion.

Keywords: Research Joint Ventures, Product Market Collusion, Empirical Test

JEL Classification: L24, L44, L52

Suggested Citation

Duso, Tomaso and Pennings, Enrico and Seldeslachts, Jo, On the Stability of Research Joint Ventures: Implications for Collusion (April 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1136063 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1136063

Tomaso Duso (Contact Author)

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) ( email )

Mohrenstra├če 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany

TU Berlin- Faculty of Economics and Management - Empirical Industrial Organization ( email )

Berlin, 10585
Germany

Enrico Pennings

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam, NL 3062 PA
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) ( email )

P.O. Box 1738
3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

Jo Seldeslachts

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB) ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) ( email )

Mohrenstra├če 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany

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