Self-Enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-Cooperative Organization of Clans
26 Pages Posted: 27 May 2008
There are 2 versions of this paper
Self-Enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-Cooperative Organization of Clans
Date Written: June 2007
Abstract
We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy. We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action.
Keywords: collective action, defence, distributional conflict, free-riding, norms, war
JEL Classification: D72, D74, H11, H41
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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