Corporate Governance and Collusive Behaviour

25 Pages Posted: 29 May 2008

See all articles by Paolo Buccirossi

Paolo Buccirossi

Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione (LEAR)

Giancarlo Spagnolo

Stockholm School of Economics (SITE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Rome 'Tor Vergata'; EIEF

Date Written: June 2007

Abstract

This chapter examines the relationship between corporate governance and competition, particularly with regard to cartel formation, and discusses how corporate governance and firm agency problems affect optimal law enforcement against cartels, both in terms of sanctions and leniency policies. Many of the conclusions appear applicable, with minor changes, to non-antitrust forms of collusion, such as collusion between auditors and management, and more generally to corporate and organized crime.

Keywords: Amnesty, Antitrust, Cartels, CEO compensation, Collusion, Corporate crime, Corporate fraud, Corporate governance, Corporate liability, Corruption, Deterrence, Employee liability, Fines, Immunity, Imprisonment, Indemnification, Judgement proofness, Leniency, Managerial incentives, Optimal sanctions, Rewards, Whistleblowers

JEL Classification: G30, K00, L20, L40

Suggested Citation

Buccirossi, Paolo and Spagnolo, Giancarlo, Corporate Governance and Collusive Behaviour (June 2007). , Vol. , pp. -, 2007. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1136675

Paolo Buccirossi (Contact Author)

Laboratorio di economia, antitrust, regolamentazione (LEAR) ( email )

Via di Monserrato 48
Rome, 00186
Italy
+39 066 830 0530 (Phone)

Giancarlo Spagnolo

Stockholm School of Economics (SITE) ( email )

P.O. Box 6501
Stockholm
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/giancarlospagnoloshomepage/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

University of Rome 'Tor Vergata' ( email )

Faculty of Economics - DEI
Via Columbia 2
Rome, RM 00133
Italy

EIEF ( email )

Via Due Macelli, 73
Rome, 00187
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://WWW.EIEF.IT

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