Parochial Politics: Ethnic Preferences and Politician Corruption

Banerjee, Abhijit V.; Pande, Rohini

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Parochial Politics: Ethnic Preferences and Politician Corruption

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6381

51 Pages Posted: 23 May 2008

See all articles by Abhijit V. Banerjee

Abhijit V. Banerjee

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics

Rohini Pande

Yale University - Economic Growth Center

There are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 2007

Abstract

This paper examines how increased voter ethnicization, defined as a greater preference for the party representing one's ethnic group, affects politician quality. If politics is characterized by incomplete policy commitment, then ethnicization reduces average winner quality for the pro-majority party with the opposite true for the minority party. The effect increases with greater numerical dominance of the majority (and so social homogeneity). Empirical evidence from a survey on politician corruption that we conducted in North India is remarkably consistent with our theoretical predictions.

Keywords: Corruption, Ethnic Voting, India

JEL Classification: O12, P16

Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation

Banerjee, Abhijit V. and Pande, Rohini, Parochial Politics: Ethnic Preferences and Politician Corruption (July 2007). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6381, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1136706