Intellectual Property Provisions in North-South Trade Agreements

32 Pages Posted: 30 May 2008

See all articles by Bernard Hoekman

Bernard Hoekman

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Kamal Saggi

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 2007

Abstract

Using a repeated game approach, this paper models a North-South trade agreement under which North offers South improved market access (via a tariff reduction) if South agrees to prevent local imitation by strengthening its protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs). We show that such an agreement arises in equilibrium if South's imitative capacity is neither too high nor too low. The paper also considers a scenario where Southern protection of IPRs is induced via a North-South transfer. A comparison of the two instruments shows that one instrument does not unambiguously dominate the other in terms of sustaining cooperation. We also analyze whether and how the availability of the second instrument affects cooperation given that one instrument is already available.

Keywords: Intellectual Property Rights, international cooperation, market Access, tariffs, trade agreements, Transfers

JEL Classification: F12, F13, L41, O19

Suggested Citation

Hoekman, Bernard and Hoekman, Bernard and Saggi, Kamal, Intellectual Property Provisions in North-South Trade Agreements (September 2007). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6460, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1138573

Bernard Hoekman (Contact Author)

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies ( email )

Fiesole, Tuscany
Italy

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Kamal Saggi

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Department of Economics ( email )

Dallas, TX 75275
United States
214-768-3274 (Phone)
214-768-1821 (Fax)

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