Recursive Global Games

20 Pages Posted: 30 May 2008

See all articles by Chryssi Giannitsarou

Chryssi Giannitsarou

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Flavio Toxvaerd

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics

Date Written: September 2007

Abstract

The present paper contributes to the literature on dynamic games with strategic complementarities, in two interrelated ways. First, we identify a class of dynamic complete information games in which intertemporal complementarities and multiple equilibria can be fruitfully analyzed. Second, we extend the analysis to an incomplete information framework, where results from the literature on global games can be applied to select a unique Markov perfect equilibrium in monotone strategies.

Keywords: dynamic global games, Dynamic supermodular games, endogenous cycles

JEL Classification: C73, D43, E32

Suggested Citation

Giannitsarou, Chryssi and Toxvaerd, Flavio, Recursive Global Games (September 2007). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6470. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1138583

Chryssi Giannitsarou (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Austin Robinson Building
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge, CB3 9DD
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Flavio Toxvaerd

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Austin Robinson Building
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge, CB3 9DD
United Kingdom

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