An Agent-Based Computational Model of the Predatory State

5 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2008

See all articles by Norman Siebrasse

Norman Siebrasse

University of New Brunswick - Fredericton - Faculty of Law

Date Written: June 2, 2008

Abstract

Olson (1993) has proposed that a self-interested bandit has an incentive to become stationary and provide public goods within his domain, in particular protection of property rights, particularly against other roving bandits. The consequent increased social productivity permits the stationary bandit (dignified with the title of king) to obtain a greater personal return than is obtained by roving bandits preying on a poorer society. At the same time, increased security provides the subjects with a greater incentive to invest, thereby leading to longer term increases in social wealth. Olson`s analysis complements the property-rights view of development most closely associated with Douglass North (North & Thomas (1973), North (1981)). North argues that respect by rulers for the property rights of subjects is responsible for economic development by providing an incentive for productive investment. Olson`s theory gives an explanation of why a self-interested ruler might choose to respect property rights. This paper presents a spatial evolutionary game-theoretic agent-based computational model of the North/Olson argument.

Keywords: Predatory state

JEL Classification: C70, H10

Suggested Citation

Siebrasse, Norman, An Agent-Based Computational Model of the Predatory State (June 2, 2008). CLEA 2008 Meetings Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1139836 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1139836

Norman Siebrasse (Contact Author)

University of New Brunswick - Fredericton - Faculty of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 4400
Fredericton, New Brunswick E3B 5A3
Canada
506-453-4725 (Phone)
506-453-4548 (Fax)

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