Civil Wars and International Trade

21 Pages Posted: 5 Jun 2008

See all articles by Philippe Martin

Philippe Martin

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Centre Maison des Sciences Economiques

Thierry Mayer

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - TEAM; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS); CEPII, Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Info. Internationales, Paris; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Mathias Thoenig

Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Geneva - Department of Political Economics

Date Written: January 2008

Abstract

This paper analyzes empirically the relationship between civil wars and international trade. We first show that trade destruction due to civil wars is very large and persistent and increases with the severity of the conflict. We then test the presence of two effects that trade can have on the risk of civil conflicts: it may act as a deterrent if trade gains are put at risk during civil wars but it may also act as an insurance if international trade provides a substitute to internal trade during civil wars. We find support for the presence of these two mechanisms and conclude that trade openness may deter the most severe civil wars (those that destroy the largest amount of trade) but may increase the risk of lower scale conflicts.

Keywords: Civil war, globalization, trade

JEL Classification: F10, F51, F52, F59

Suggested Citation

Martin, Philippe and Mayer, Thierry and Thoenig, Mathias, Civil Wars and International Trade (January 2008). , Vol. , pp. -, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1140588

Philippe Martin (Contact Author)

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - Centre Maison des Sciences Economiques ( email )

106/112 boulevard de l'Hopital
Paris Cedex 13, 75647
France

Thierry Mayer

Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne - TEAM ( email )

106-112 boulevard de l'hôpital
Cedex 13 Paris, P75647
France

HOME PAGE: http://team.univ-paris1.fr/teamperso/mayer/thierry.htm

Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS) ( email )

28, rue des Saints-Peres
75007 Paris
France
+33 1 4407 8267 (Phone)
+33 1 4407 8267 (Fax)

CEPII, Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Info. Internationales, Paris ( email )

9 Rue Georges Pitard
Paris Cedex 15, F-75015
France

HOME PAGE: http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/pagepers/mayer.htm

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Mathias Thoenig

Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS) ( email )

28, rue des Saints-Peres
75007 Paris
France
+33 1 4313 6380 (Phone)
+33 1 4313 6382 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

University of Geneva - Department of Political Economics ( email )

40 boulevard du Pont-d'Arve
Geneva 4, CH-1211
Switzerland
+41 22 379 8274 (Phone)
+41 22 379 8293 (Fax)

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