The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited

17 Pages Posted: 9 Jun 2008

See all articles by Pablo Brañas-Garza

Pablo Brañas-Garza

Universidad Loyola Andalucia

Teresa García-Muñoz

University of Granada - Campus La Cartuja

Shoshana Neuman

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2008

Abstract

This paper provides an empirical demonstration of high stakes incentives in relation to religious practice. It shows that, when both positive (carrot) and negative (stick) incentives are available, the former are more effective than the latter. Specifically, it is shown that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell when estimating the production of religious commodities (church-attendance and praying equations).

Keywords: carrot/stick, Economics of Religion, high stakes, punishment, rewards

JEL Classification: C91, D64, Z13

Suggested Citation

Brañas-Garza, Pablo and García-Muñoz, Teresa and Neuman, Shoshana, The Big Carrot: High Stake Incentives Revisited (January 2008). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6666, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1140948

Pablo Brañas-Garza

Universidad Loyola Andalucia ( email )

c/ Escritor Castilla Aguayo
Córdoba, 14004
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/pablobranasgarza/home

Teresa García-Muñoz

University of Granada - Campus La Cartuja ( email )

Campus La Cartuja
Granada
Spain

Shoshana Neuman (Contact Author)

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel
+972 3 531 8393 (Phone)
+972 3 535 3180 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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