The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics

50 Pages Posted: 17 Oct 1997  

Paul H. Edelman

Vanderbilt University - Law School

James Ming Chen

Michigan State University - College of Law

Abstract

We analyze the relative voting power of the Justices based upon Supreme Court decisions during October Term 1994 and October Term 1995. We take two approaches, both based on ideas derived from cooperative game theory. One of the measures we use has been used in connection with voting rights cases. After naming the Most Dangerous Justice, we conclude by identifying and explaining the inverse relationship between seniority and voting power.

Keywords: Shapley-Shubik index, Frank-Shapley index, Banzhaf index, voting power, Supreme Court

Suggested Citation

Edelman, Paul H. and Chen, James Ming, The Most Dangerous Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics. Southern California Law Review, Vol. 70, p. 63, 1996. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=11413

Paul H. Edelman (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States
615-322-0990 (Phone)
615-322-6631 (Fax)

James Ming Chen

Michigan State University - College of Law ( email )

318 Law College Building
East Lansing, MI 48824-1300
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
154
Rank
156,596
Abstract Views
2,174