Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of Administrative Process and Judicial Review

in the Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 26, No. 6 (1997).

Posted: 17 Oct 1997

Abstract

The ability of Congress to structure the institutional costs of agency and judicial decision making gives it considerable control over regulatory policy. The authors analyze the role of decision costs through models of agency-court interaction and consider the ability of Congress to manipulate such costs for its own policy purposes. The authors explore the implications of these models by examining recent congressional efforts to change the decision cost structures of agencies and courts. In particular, the authors consider the so-called "Bumpers Amendments of the 1980s and, from the 1990s, the Republican-proposed imposition of cost-benefit analysis on agency decision making.

Suggested Citation

Spiller, Pablo T. and Tiller, Emerson H., Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of Administrative Process and Judicial Review. in the Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 26, No. 6 (1997).. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=11415

Pablo T. Spiller

University of California, Berkeley - Business & Public Policy Group ( email )

545 Student Services Building
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-1502 (Phone)
510-642-2826 (Fax)

Emerson H. Tiller (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Pritzker School of Law ( email )

375 E. Chicago Ave
Chicago, IL 60611
United States

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