Evidence on the Insurance Effect of Marginal Income Taxes

37 Pages Posted: 10 Jun 2008

See all articles by Charles Grant

Charles Grant

University of Reading

Christos Koulovatianos

Department of Finance, University of Luxembourg

Alexander Michaelides

Imperial College Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Mario Padula

University "Ca' Foscari" of Venice; CSEF

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 2008

Abstract

Marginal income taxes may have an insurance effect by decreasing the effective fluctuations of after-tax individual income. By compressing the idiosyncratic component of personal income fluctuations, higher marginal taxes should be negatively correlated with the dispersion of consumption across households, a necessary implication of an insurance effect of taxation. Our study empirically examines this negative correlation, exploiting the ample variation of state taxes across US states. We show that taxes are negatively correlated with the consumption dispersion of the within-state distribution of non-durable consumption and that this correlation is robust.

Keywords: Consumption Insurance, Tax Distortions, Undiversifiable Earnings Risk

JEL Classification: E21, H20, H31

Suggested Citation

Grant, Charles and Koulovatianos, Christos and Michaelides, Alexander and Padula, Mario, Evidence on the Insurance Effect of Marginal Income Taxes (February 2008). , Vol. , pp. -, 2008. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1141616

Charles Grant (Contact Author)

University of Reading ( email )

Whiteknights
Reading, Berkshire RG6 6AH
United Kingdom

Christos Koulovatianos

Department of Finance, University of Luxembourg ( email )

4 Rue Albert Borschette
Luxembourg, L-1246
Luxembourg

Alexander Michaelides

Imperial College Business School ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London SW7 2AZ, SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Mario Padula

University "Ca' Foscari" of Venice ( email )

Dorsoduro 3246
Venice, Veneto 30123
Italy
+390412349181 (Phone)
+390412349176 (Fax)

CSEF

Via Don Melillo I
Fisciano, Salerno, 84084
Italy

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