Are Capital Controls in the Foreign Exchange Market Effective?

39 Pages Posted: 11 Jun 2008

See all articles by Stefan Straetmans

Stefan Straetmans

Maastricht University ; University of Antwerp - Faculty of Applied Economics

Roald J. Versteeg

Imperial College London - Accounting, Finance, and Macroeconomics

Christian C. P. Wolff

University of Luxembourg; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: February 1, 2008

Abstract

One of the reasons for governments to use capital controls is to obtain some degree of monetary independence. This paper investigates the link between capital controls and interest differentials/forward premia. This to test whether they can indeed give governments the power to drive exchange rates away from parity conditions. Two capital control variables are constructed in addition to the standard IMF capital control dummy. These variables are used to determine the date of capital account liberalization in a panel of Western European as well as emerging countries. Results show that capital controls do not give governments extra monetary freedom. There is even some evidence that capital controls decrease the level of monetary freedom governments enjoy for a number of countries.

Keywords: Capital controls, Exchange Rates, Forward premia, Interest differentials, Monetary freedom

JEL Classification: E42, F21, F31, G15

Suggested Citation

Straetmans, Stefan and Versteeg, Roald J. and Wolff, Christian C. P., Are Capital Controls in the Foreign Exchange Market Effective? (February 1, 2008). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6727, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1141633

Stefan Straetmans (Contact Author)

Maastricht University ( email )

Tongersestraat 53
Maastricht, 6200 MD
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://www.stefanstraetmans.com

University of Antwerp - Faculty of Applied Economics ( email )

Prinsstraat 13
Antwerp, B-2000
Belgium

Roald J. Versteeg

Imperial College London - Accounting, Finance, and Macroeconomics ( email )

South Kensington campus
London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Christian C. P. Wolff

University of Luxembourg ( email )

6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi
Kirchberg Campus
Luxembourg, South 1359
Luxembourg

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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