Do Benevolent Aspects Have Room in Explaining EU Budget Receipts?

31 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2008

See all articles by Heikki Kauppi

Heikki Kauppi

University of Turku - Department of Economics; Bank of Finland - Research; University of Helsinki - Department of Political and Economic Studies

Mika Widgren

University of Turku - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: April 2008

Abstract

This paper evaluates the determination of receipts from EU budget by considering a richer institutional structure than in earlier studies. We assume that the member states have self-interested objectives in CM trying to minimize their contributions within the given framework of the EU budget whereas EP is supposed to support benevolent objectives using its competence in non-compulsory expenditure, i.e. structural spending, internal and external policies and administration. CM exerts power in the allocation of both compulsory expenditure, mainly consisting of agricultural spending, and in non-compulsory expenditure. The purpose of this paper is not, however, to evaluate EP's influence but rather how the assumed benevolent objectives of EP and income differences turn into member states' budget receipts in a power politics based model.

Keywords: EU budget, European integration, voting power

JEL Classification: C71, D70, D72

Suggested Citation

Kauppi, Heikki and Widgren, Mika T., Do Benevolent Aspects Have Room in Explaining EU Budget Receipts? (April 2008). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6778, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1141683

Heikki Kauppi (Contact Author)

University of Turku - Department of Economics ( email )

20014 Turku
Finland

Bank of Finland - Research ( email )

P.O. Box 160
FIN-00101 Helsinki
Finland

University of Helsinki - Department of Political and Economic Studies

P.O. Box 54
FIN-00014 Helsinki
Finland

Mika T. Widgren

University of Turku - Department of Economics ( email )

FIN-20500 Turku
Finland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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