Poverty Traps and Social Protection

36 Pages Posted: 26 Jun 2008

See all articles by Christopher B. Barrett

Christopher B. Barrett

Cornell University - Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics & Management

Michael R. Carter

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Agricultural & Applied Economics

Munenobu Ikegami

Hosei University - Department of Economics

Date Written: February 1, 2008

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that there are potentially large returns to social protection policy that stakes out a productive safety net below the vulnerable and keeps them from slipping into a poverty trap. Much of the value of the productive safety net comes from mitigating the ex ante effects of risk and crowding in additional investment. The analysis also explores the implications of different mechanisms of targeting social protection transfers. In the presence of poverty traps, modestly regressive targeting based on critical asset thresholds may have better long-run poverty reduction effects than traditional needs-based targeting.

Keywords: Poverty traps, Targeting transfers, Dynamic modeling

JEL Classification: D91, I30, O12

Suggested Citation

Barrett, Christopher B. and Carter, Michael R. and Ikegami, Munenobu, Poverty Traps and Social Protection (February 1, 2008). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1141881 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1141881

Christopher B. Barrett (Contact Author)

Cornell University - Charles H. Dyson School of Applied Economics & Management ( email )

315 Warren Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853-7801
United States
607-255-4489 (Phone)
607-255-9984 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://aem.cornell.edu/faculty_sites/cbb2/

Michael R. Carter

University of Wisconsin - Madison - Department of Agricultural & Applied Economics ( email )

427 Lorch St.
Madison, WI 53706-1503
United States
608-263-2478 (Phone)

Munenobu Ikegami

Hosei University - Department of Economics ( email )

Tokyo
Japan

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