Fast Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations

52 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2008

See all articles by Paola Conconi

Paola Conconi

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES)

Giovanni Facchini

Tinbergen Institute

Maurizio Zanardi

University of Surrey - School of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2008

Abstract

Fast Track Authority (FTA) is the institutional procedure in the Unites States whereby Congress grants to the President the power to negotiate international trade agreements. Under FTA, Congress can only approve or reject negotiated trade deals, with no possibility of amending them. In this paper, we examine the determinants of FTA voting decisions and the implications of this institutional procedure for trade negotiations. We describe a simple two-country trade model, in which industries are unevenly distributed across constituencies. In the foreign country, trade negotiating authority is delegated to the executive, while in the home country Congress can retain the power to amend trade agreements. We show that legislators' FTA voting behavior depends on the trade policy interests of their own constituencies as well as those of the majority of Congress. Empirical analysis of the determinants of all FTA votes between 1974 (when fast track was first introduced) and 2002 (when it was last granted) provides strong support for the predictions of our model.

Keywords: Fast Track Authority, Strategic Delegation, Trade Negotiations

JEL Classification: D72, F13

Suggested Citation

Conconi, Paola and Facchini, Giovanni and Zanardi, Maurizio, Fast Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations (April 2008). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP6790, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1142172

Paola Conconi (Contact Author)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )

Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50 - C.P. 114
Brussels, B-1050
Belgium
32 2 650 2345 (Phone)
32 2 650 4475 (Fax)

Giovanni Facchini

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://paople.few.eur.nl/facchini

Maurizio Zanardi

University of Surrey - School of Economics ( email )

Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH
United Kingdom

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